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I. INTRODUCTION
On November 6, 1986, President Reagan signed into law the Immi-
gration Reform and Control Act (IRCA),1 proclaiming it to be the most
difficult legislative undertaking in the previous three Congresses.2 The
Act's controversial centerpiece provides for sanctions against employers
who knowingly hire, recruit, or refer for a fee undocumented aliens.3
1. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.)
[hereinafter IRCA].
2. Statement by President Ronald Reagan upon signing S. 1200, 22 WEEKLY CoM'. PRs.
Doc. 1534, 1537 (Nov. 10, 1986) [hereinafter Signing Statement]; see also 131 CONG. REc. S7039
(daily ed. May 23, 1985) (statement of Sen. Simpson) ("three successive administrations have at-
tempted to reform our Nation's immigration laws").
3. IRCA, supra note 1, § 274A(a)(1), at 3360. Prior to 1986 immigration law made it unlaw-
ful to transport or to harbor undocumented aliens, but not unlawful to employ them. 8 U.S.C. §
1323
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While these sanctions were heralded as the most comprehensive reform
in immigration law in over thirty years,4 opposition to them in Congress
and among civil rights organizations was strong. These groups feared
that employers seeking to avoid sanctions would discriminate in em-
ployment against Hispanics, Asians, and other ethnically or racially
identifiable minorities,5 whether or not these individuals were United
States citizens or nationals, properly admitted aliens, or undocumented
workers awaiting permanent residency under the IRCA's amnesty pro-
visions." In order to assuage this fear and directly confront the threat of
discrimination, Congress included within the Act section 274B,' which
protects employees against employers who discriminate on the basis of
national origin8 or alienage.9 This section commonly is referred to as the
Act's antidiscrimination provision.
Each month dozens of complaints alleging violations of section
274B are filed.10 The status of the overwhelming majority of these com-
plaints is uncertain. Most of the uncertainty concerns the standard of
proof necessary to establish a violation of the antidiscrimination provi-
sion. Upon signing the Act into law, President Reagan issued a state-
1324(a)(4) (1982) (repealed 1986). Consequently, the economic incentives which encouraged illegal
entry continued. As early as 1975, the House Judiciary Committee recognized that economics un-
derlie the illegal alien problem:
The Committee believes that the primary reason for the illegal alien problem is the economic
imbalance between the United States and the countries from which aliens come, coupled with
the chance of employment in the United States. Consequently, it is apparent that this prob-
lem cannot be solved as long as jobs can be obtained by those who enter this country ille-
galy. ...
H.R. REP. No. 506, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1975).
4. See Signing Statement, supra note 2, at 1534.
5. See 132 CONG. REC. H9718 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986) (statement of Rep. Roybal) (stating
that "[w]e are fearful that sanctions will definitely result in discrimination against the Hispanics
and the Asians in this Nation"); Immigration Control and Legalization Amendments: Hearings on
H.R. 3080 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees and International Law of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 123 (1985) (statement of Richard Fajardo, Acting
Associate Counsel, Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund).
6. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1986, at Al, col. 1 (stating that approximately 3.5 to 6 million
undocumented aliens may be eligible for amnesty and ultimately citizenship under the IRCA). To
qualify for amnesty an alien must have entered the United States before January 1, 1982, and
resided here continuously since then. IRCA, supra note 1, § 245A(a)(2)(A), at 3394.
7. IRCA, supra note 1, § 274B, at 3375-80.
8. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88 (1973) (concluding that one's national origin
is understood to refer to the "country where a person was born, or ... the country from which his
or her ancestors came" (footnote omitted)).
9. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (1982) (stating that "[a]lienage" refers only to noncitizenship,
and does not denote any particular national origin or race). On discrimination against aliens, see
generally Das, Discrimination in Employment Against Aliens-The Impact of the Constitution
and Federal Civil Rights Laws, 35 U. Prrr. L. REv. 499 (1974).
10. As of August 1, 1988, over 200 complaints alleging violation of § 274B have been filed
(source on file with Author).
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ment declaring that Congress intended that only intentional
discrimination would constitute a violation of section 274B.11 The pro-
vision's author, Representative Barney Frank, immediately protested,
calling the President's interpretation "intellectually dishonest, mean
spirited" and inaccurate.1" According to Representative Frank, Con-
gress intended that both intentional and unintentional discrimination
would constitute a violation of section 274B. In the midst of this contin-
uing controversy,1" others questioned the necessity of section 274B, con-
vinced that existing law was adequate to protect aliens threatened with
employment discrimination. These individuals believe that section
274B is burdensome and, therefore, call for its repeal. 4
The status of complaints filed under section 274B will depend in
large measure on the substantive theories of antidiscrimination law that
the plaintiff is required to satisfy."5 The objective of this Note, there-
fore, is to determine the intended theory of liability and corresponding
standard of proof required to show a violation of section 274B. Presi-
dent Reagan determined that the theory is disparate treatment, 6 while
the bill's author determined that the theory is disparate impact."
In order to assess the relative merits of each position, this Note will
analyze section 274B in the context of its legislative history along with
its relationship to other antidiscrimination laws. More specifically, Part
II describes the coverage of section 274B. Part III discusses the frame-
work of Title VII, section 703(a), of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title
VII), 8 and Title 42, section 1981, of the United States Code. Title VII
is examined because it provides the theoretical model on which section
274B is based. Section 1981 is examined because it is possible that it
renders section 274B redundant by protecting those individuals already
adequately covered by section 274B. Part IV extends the discussion of
Title VII by considering its various theories of liability. Unlike most
statutes, Title VII permits plaintiffs to proceed essentially under one of
three theories-each theory containing a different burden of proof stan-
11. Signing Statement, supra note 2, at 1535.
12. N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1986, at A12, col. 1.
13. See, e.g., Guttentag, Immigration-Related Employment Discrimination: Prohibition and
Remedies Under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 16 IMMIGR. NEWSL., Mar.-Apr.
1987, at 5, 22 (arguing contrary to the President's position).
14. IRCA, supra note 1, § 274B(K)(2), at 3379. Section 274B(K)(2) of the IRCA provides
that § 274B shall automatically terminate in the event no significant discrimination results from
employer sanction, or if § 274B creates "an unreasonable burden on employers" hiring legal aliens.
Id. Any repeal of § 274B will require a joint resolution of Congress.
15. See infra notes 103-10 and accompanying text.
16. Signing Statement, supra note 2, at 1535; see infra notes 111-26 and accompanying text.
17. N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1986, at B14, col. 3 (statement of Rep. Frank); see infra notes 127-41
and accompanying text.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
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dard. These differing standards turn on whether the plaintiff is re-
quired to prove discriminatory intent, or simply the existence of a
discriminatory impact from an allegedly nondiscriminatory practice.
Part V compares the advantages and disadvantages of requiring a plain-
tiff to prove either discriminatory intent or discriminatory impact. Part
VI reviews the President's position that only intentional discrimination
is prohibited by section 274B. Following this discussion, Part VII con-
siders the legislative history of the Act's antidiscrimination provision.
Part VII asserts that the President's reading of the provision is mis-
guided and not anchored in the Act's legislative history. This Note con-
cludes in Part VIII with a brief consideration of the future of litigation
under section 274B.
II. THE ANTIDISCRIMINATION PROVISION
Section 274B makes it unlawful to discriminate against any indi-
vidual, other than an unauthorized alien, because of that individual's
national origin or citizenship status. 19 This prohibition extends to hir-
ing, recruitment, referral for a fee, or discharge.20 Persons protected
from discrimination on the basis of citizenship status include persons
who are United States citizens, nationals, or aliens classified as "in-
tending citizens." 2' 1 An intending citizen is, generally, an alien lawfully
admitted for either permanent or temporary residency, or granted asy-
lum under the Act's amnesty program.22 In order to receive section
274B's protections, a person granted residency status must show a clear
intention to become a United States citizen by executing a declaration
to that effect.23 Failure to seek naturalization within six months of eligi-
bility, or a grant of citizenship within two years of making application,
removes an individual from the protected class unless the applicant can
establish due diligence in pursuing naturalization.24
The IRCA places limitations on the scope of section 274B. For in-
19. IRCA, supra note 1, § 274B(a)(1)(A), (B), at 3374. The IRCA provides in part:
It is an unfair immigration-related employment practice for a person or other entity to dis-
criminate against any individual (other than an unauthorized alien) with respect to the hiring,
or recruitment or referral for a fee, of the individual for employment or the discharging of the
individual from employment-
(A) because of such individual's national origin, or
(B) in the case of a citizen or intending citizen ... because of such individual's citizenship
status.
Id.
20. Id. § 274B(a)(1), at 3374.
21. Id. § 274B(a)(3)(A), (B), at 3374-75.
22. Id. § 274B(a)(3)(B)(i), at 3375.
23. Id. § 274B(a)(3)(B)(ii), at 3375.
24. Id.
1326 [Vol. 41:1323
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stance, employers who employ three or fewer workers are exempt,2 5 as
are claims of discrimination based on national origin if the aggrieved
party already is covered by Title VII.2 6 If discrimination based on citi-
zenship is required by law, executive order, or federal, state or local
government contract, no action can be maintained under the Act.27 Ad-
ditionally, if the Attorney General determines that it is essential for an
employer to retain only American citizens in order to conduct business
with the United States government, the provision prohibiting discrimi-
nation because of citizenship status will not apply. 8 Finally, an em-
ployer does not violate section 274B by employing a United States
citizen in preference to an alien if the two individuals are equally
qualified.29
A person adversely affected by discrimination prohibited under the
Act may file a complaint with the newly created Office of Special Coun-
sel in the Department of Justice.30 The Special Counsel is charged with
investigating complaints of unfair immigration-related employment
practices, and, if warranted, prosecuting these complaints before an ad-
ministrative law judge (ALJ). 1 Upon receiving a complaint the Special
Counsel has 120 days within which to determine whether the charges
are meritorious and, therefore, warrant prosecution.2
A complaint may not be filed with the Special Counsel if the same
complaint, based on the same facts, is fied with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) pursuant to Title VII.33 In the event,
25. Id. § 274B(a)(2)(A), at 3374.
26. Id. § 274B(a)(2)(B), at 3374. Title VII's protection against national origin discrimination
extends to employees working for an employer who hires over fifteen workers and employs them
for over twenty weeks a year. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982).
27. IRCA, supra note 1, § 274B(a)(2)(C), at 3374.
28. Id.
29. Id. § 274B(a)(4), at 3375. The equally qualified exception applies only to hiring and does
not affect the prohibition against discriminatory discharge in § 274B(1). Moreover, the burden of
proof is on the employer to show that the two individuals were equally qualified. 132 CONG. REC.
H9768 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986) (statement of Rep. Lungran, sponsor of the provision).
30. IRCA, supra note 1, § 274B(b)(1), at 3375. The Special Counsel is appointed by the
President, and approved by the Senate, for a four year term. Id. § 274B(c)(1), at 3375-76. The Act
also provides for the establishment of regional offices within the Office of Special Counsel. Id.
§ 274B(c)(4), at 3376.
31. IRCA, supra note 1, § 274B(d)(1), at 3376.
32. Id.
33. Id. § 274B(b)(2), at 3375. Claims based on national origin discrimination are now divided
between the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Special Counsel. The
EEOC retains responsibility under Title VII for investigating claims of national origin discrimina-
tion against employers with fifteen or more employees. The Special Counsel is responsible for en-
forcing the IRCA's prohibition against national origin discrimination in cases involving employers
with four to fourteen employees. Allegations of discrimination based on citizenship status remain
the sole prerogative of the Special Counsel. But cf. 132 CONG. REc. H9769 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986)
(statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (questioning the need for an additional bureaucracy and warn-
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however, that the EEOC dismisses a complaint because it falls outside
the scope of its jurisdiction, the aggrieved party may refile with the
Special Counsel. 4 Likewise, if the Special Counsel dismisses a com-
plaint for being outside the purview of section 274B, the aggrieved
party may refile with the EEOC. 5 Thus, Congress has prohibited over-
lap between the EEOC and the Special Counsel, while at the same time
insuring that a dismissal of a complaint because it falls outside the ju-
risdictional domain of either agency does not jeopardize a party's right
to file with the other.
The Act also provides for a private right of action in the event that
the Special Counsel decides not to file a charge. Congress has limited
this right of action to "knowing and intentional discriminatory activity
or a pattern or practice of discriminatory activity." 8 The private liti-
gant must file his complaint with an ALJ within 90 days of the expira-
tion of the 120 days allowed the Special Counsel. 7 Under no
circumstances may a complaint be filed if the complaining party waits
in excess of 180 days from the alleged discriminatory event before sub-
mitting a charge to the Special Counsel.3 8
Section 274B provides the ALJ with several options if discrimina-
tion is found to exist. In addition to issuing cease and desist orders,3 9
the ALJ is empowered to compel reinstatement of adversely affected
individuals,40 award back pay,41 and levy civil fines of not more than
ing of potential bureaucratic confusion).
34. IRCA, supra note 1, § 274B(b)(2), at 3375.
35. Id. Parties who choose to refile with the EEOC must meet all Title VII statutory require-
ments before they will be allowed to do so.
36. Id. § 274B(d)(2), at 3376.
37. Unfair Immigration-Related Employment Practices, 52 Fed. Reg. 37,402, 37,411 (1987)
(to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 4.303).
38. IRCA, supra note 1, § 274B(d)(3), at 3376. It is unsettled whether failure to comply with
the 180 day statute of limitations will absolutely extinguish the claim. The courts and the ALJs
may turn to Title VII case law to reach an answer. Under Title VII a person who waits in excess of
the 180 day statute of limitations is ordinarily estopped from maintaining a cause of action; how-
ever, this is a flexible requirement and may be extended for equitable reasons. See, e.g., Zipes v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1982) (holding that untimely filing with the EEOC does
not raise a jurisdictional defect, but results in treatment analogous to that under a statute of
limitations, and is subject to waiver, estoppel and equitable tolling); see also Kobdish, Section 102
of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986: An Analysis of the Act's Employment Dis-
crimination Provision, in THE NEw SIMPSON-RODINO IMMIGRATION LAW OF 1986, at 148, 177-76
(1986).
39. IRCA, supra note 1, § 274B(g)(2)(A), at 3377.
40. Id. § 274B(g)(2)(B)(iii), at 3378.
41. Id. The liability of an employer for back pay is limited to a two year period prior to the
date of filing the discrimination charge with the ALJ. Additionally, money earned or earnable by
the aggrieved party "with reasonable diligence" during the two year period will reduce the back
pay otherwise allowable. Id. § 274B(g)(2)(C), at 3378.
[Vol. 41:13231328
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one thousand dollars for each individual discriminated against.42 Apart
from these options, the ALJ also is empowered to order employers who
normally retain information only on those individuals actually hired to
maintain extensive records of all job applicants.43 The ALJ, at her dis-
cretion, may award attorneys' fees if it is determined that the losing
party's argument is without merit." The Special Counsel cannot be
awarded fees.45
III. EXISTING ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW
By enacting section 274B a majority in Congress generally acknowl-
edged that existing antidiscrimination law is fil-suited to prohibit dis-
crimination based on alienage. Specifically, the majority's concern was
that Title VII and 42 U.S.C. section 1981 were insufficient to protect
potential victims of unfair immigration-related employment practices.46
Members in the minority4' and the Administration,48 however, did not
share the majority's concern over the need for additional protections.
Opponents of section 274B considered it duplicative of existing law,49
while proponents argued that the extension of protections was abso-
lutely essential if employer sanctions were not to have a deleterious ef-
42. IRCA, supra note 1, § 274B(g)(2)(B)(iv)(I), at 3378. If the employer has previously been
convicted of unfair immigration-related employment practices a civil penalty can be imposed as
high as $2,000 for each individual discriminated against. Id. § 274B(g)(2)(B)(iv)(II), at 3378.
43. IRCA, supra note 1, § 274B(g)(2)(B)(i), at 3377 (stating that the employer is required to
maintain records of the applicant's name and address for up to three years).
44. Id. § 274B(h), at 3378; see infra note 211 and accompanying text.
45. IRCA, supra note 1, § 274B(h), at 3378.
46. H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 70 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 682],
reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5674 [hereinafter 1986 U.S. CODE]. In
reporting the IRCA to the full House, the Judiciary Committee reiterated this concern when it
stated:
It makes no sense to admit immigrants and refugees to this country, require them to work
and then allow employers to refuse to hire them because of their immigration (non-citizen-
ship) status. Since Title VII does not provide any protection against employment discrimina-
tion based on alienage or non-citizen status, the Committee is of the view that the instant
legislation must do so.
Id.
47. Id. pt. 2, at 47, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE, supra note 46, at 5785 (minority views on
the IRCA's antidiscrimination provision, questioning whether it is needed).
48. See generally Anti-Discrimination Provision of H.R. 3080: Joint Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judici-
ary, and the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 193 (1985) [hereinafter Joint Hearing] (statement of Bradford Reynolds,
Assistant Att'y Gen., Civil Rights Division Department of Justice) (indicating the Administration's
opposition to the antidiscrimination provision of the IRCA).
49. Joint Hearing, supra note 48, at 7 (testimony of Clarence Pendleton, former chairperson,
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights) (stating that existing antidiscrimination law provides adequate
protection against alienage discrimination); see infra note 93.
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fect.50 The relative merits of each position can be determined by
examining Title VII and section 1981, and then comparing each with
the protections embodied in section 274B.
A. Section 1981
1. Civil Rights Act of 1866
Since its inception in 1866,5' courts have interpreted the legislative
history of section 198152 in an effort to determine the legitimate bound-
aries of the statute's application. Early judicial decisions read the his-
tory of the statute narrowly, thus stemming its utility.5 3 It was not until
almost a century after its enactment that the United States Supreme
Court in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.5 4 rejuvenated section 1981 and
made it a mainstay of modern civil rights litigation. The symbiosis be-
tween section 1981's historical beginnings and its contemporary judicial
application is nowhere more apparent than in the determination of
whether the statute prohibits both state and private discrimination
based on alienage.
Section 1981 was enacted twice. The legislative precursor of the
statute was section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.55 This Act, intro-
duced by Senator Lyman Trumbull, was passed pursuant to section 2 of
the thirteenth amendment56 and was intended to protect newly emanci-
pated slaves.5 7 The legislation provided that most persons born in the
50. 132 CONG. REc. H9770 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986) (statement of Rep. Fish).
51. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (re-enacted by Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16
Stat. 140) [hereinafter Act of 1866].
52. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982). Section 1981 provides in part: "All persons within the jurisdic-
tion of the United States shall have the same right. . . [to the] equal benefit of all laws ... as is
enjoyed by white citizens.... ." Id.
53. For a thorough discussion of the early development and application of § 1981, see Com-
ment, Developments in the Law-Section 1981, 15 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 29, 61-64 (1980).
54. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
55. Act of 1866, supra note 51, § 1, at 27. Section 1 of the 1866 Act reads in part:
Be it enacted. . . [t]hat all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign
power ... are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every
race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude
. . . shall have the same right. . . [to the] . . . full and equal benefit of all laws . . . as is
enjoyed by white citizens.
Id. (emphasis in original).
56. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2. The thirteenth amendment provides in part: "Section 1.
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, . . shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction. Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appro-
priate legislation." Id. §§ 1, 2.
At the time of the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, only the thirteenth amendment had
been ratified leaving it as the sole constitutional basis for the 1866 Act. See, e.g., Tillman v. Whea-
ton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 439 n.11 (1973); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22
(1883).
57. See, e.g., General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 386 (1982); Run-
1330 [Vol. 41:1323
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United States were citizens and enumerated certain rights, attendant to
that status, that were to be enjoyed without discrimination due to race,
color, or previous condition of servitude.58 Though the 1866 Act was
passed over the veto of President Andrew Johnson, its supporters
feared that future Congresses or the courts would eviscerate the gains
made.59 They were aware of considerable disagreement over the scope
of the thirteenth amendment, and were cognizant of arguments ques-
tioning Congress' power to enforce the amendment by appropriate leg-
islation.60 Against this background Congress passed, and the states
ratified, the fourteenth amendment, thereby grounding the rights of
newly freed slaves on a more secure constitutional foundation.l
2. Civil Rights Act of 1870
Upon adoption of the fourteenth amendment, 2 Congress passed
the Civil Rights Act of 1870.63 Congress intended this Act to facilitate
the implementation of the new amendment6 4 and to readopt pre-ex-
isting civil rights legislation. 5 Thus, section 18 of the 1870 Act re-incor-
porated the entire Civil Rights Act of 1866.66 Congress slightly modified
yon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 179 (1976).
58. See Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 112-15 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also supra
note 55.
59. See generally Note, Section 1981 and Private Discrimination: An Historical Justifica-
tion for a Judicial Trend, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1024 (1972) (discussing the historical develop-
ment of § 1981 and the difficulties faced by the 1866 Act's supporters in assuring its effective
enforcement).
60. The extent to which Congress disagreed is exemplified by the congressional debates on
the Civil Rights Act of 1866. According to Senator Willard Saulsbury, for example, the thirteenth
amendment simply required:
[A] person who heretofore was a slave of another shall no longer be his slave, and it operates
no further. It bestows no rights further than to relieve him from the burdens of servitude and
slavery. A man may be a free man and not possess the same civil rights as other men.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 476-77 (1866), quoted in Comment, supra note 53, at 44. Sena-
tor Edgar Cowan, echoing Senator Saulsbury, maintained that "[the thirteenth a]mendment, eve-
rybody knows and nobody dare deny, was simply made to liberate the negro slave from his master.
That is all there is of it. . . ." Id. at 499, quoted in Comment, supra note 53, at 44.
61. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 436 (1968) (stating that "some members of
Congress supported the [flourteenth [a]mendment 'in order to eliminate doubt as to the constitu-
tional validity of the Civil Rights Act [of 1866]'" (quoting Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 32-33
(1948)); see also Comment, supra note 53, at 57 n.128.
62. The fourteenth amendment was adopted by three-fourths of the states on July 21, 1868.
63. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140, 140-46 [hereinafter Act of 1870].
64. See generally Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MicH. L.
REv. 1323, 1333 (1952).
65. Id. at 1333-34.
66. Act of 1870, supra note 63, § 18, at 144. Section 18 of the 1870 Act reads:
And be it further enacted, [t]hat the act to protect all persons in the United States in their
civil rights, and furnish the means of their vindication, passed April nine, eighteen hundred
and sixty-six, is hereby re-enacted; and sections sixteen and seventeen hereof shall be en-
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the language of section 1 of the 1866 Act 7 when it amended the phrase
"citizens of any race or color" 8 to read "all persons." s The change was
codified as section 16 of the Civil Rights Act of 1870. Under section 16,
therefore, all persons were given rights that previously were granted
only to citizens in section 1 of the 1866 Act.
Introduced in Senate Bill 365, section 16 had its genesis in the so-
licitude of its sponsor, Senator William Stewart of Nevada, towards
Chinese aliens subject to discriminatory treatment under the laws of
California. 0 In proposing that section 1 of the 1866 Act be expanded to
include all persons, citizen and noncitizen, Senator Stewart eloquently
stated that "'[i]t is as solemn a duty as can be devolved upon this Con-
gress to see that [these] people are protected, to see that they have the
equal protection of the laws, notwithstanding that they are aliens.' "71
Thus, Congress clearly intended that aliens be protected under the 1870
Act against discriminatory treatment by the states. Correspondingly,
the Supreme Court has long held that state law that discriminates on
the basis of alienage can be sustained only if it withstands strict judicial
scrutiny.
7 2
While the protection of aliens against discriminatory state practice
is well settled, the issue of whether an alien can maintain a cause of
action for private discrimination remains in considerable flux. The issue
again turns on a reading of the legislative history of section 1981.
forced according to the provisions of said act.
Id. (emphasis in original).
67. Id. § 16, at 144. Section 16 of the 1870 Act reads in part:
And be it further enacted, [t]hat all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State and Territory in the United States... to the full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property as is enjoyed
by white citizens ....
Id. (emphasis in original).
68. See supra notes 51, 55.
69. See supra note 67.
70. See Bhandari v. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 829 F.2d 1343, 1346 & n.6 (5th Cir.
1987), petition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3542 (U.S. Feb. 2, 1988) (No. 97-1293).
71. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 200 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted)
(quoting CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3658 (1870)).
72. See, e.g., Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 (1984); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971). In Graham the Court stated that "classifications based on alienage, like those based on
nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a class
are a prime example of a 'discrete and insular' minority. . . for whom such heightened judicial
solicitude is appropriate." Id. at 372 (footnotes and citations omitted).
The Court has articulated a narrow exception to the rule that state alienage discrimination
triggers strict scrutiny. This exception, known as the "political function" exception, excludes from
review those laws that deny aliens jobs related to the process of democratic self-government. The
political function exception generally is invoked in those instances where a job involves discretion-
ary power related to a basic governmental function. Thus, for example, United States citizenship
can be a prerequisite for applicants seeking jobs as police officers, Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291
(1978), and probation officers, Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982).
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Courts addressing this issue are confronted by a statute that was en-
acted ultimately as the product of a redaction of two separate congres-
sional acts, each with its own legislative history.
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 had its foundation in the
thirteenth amendment and was intended to prohibit racial discrimina-
tion, whether public or private, against citizens."3 Section 1 did not ad-
dress alienage. By contrast, section 16 of the Civil Rights Act of 1870
was concerned intimately with alienage. Because section 16 was enacted
in conjunction with the fourteenth amendment, however, it potentially
circumscribes only state action.
74
The confusion regarding the reach of section 1981 stems in large
part from an historical note appended to the 1874 recodification of fed-
eral statutory law. The note indicates that section 16 of the 1870 Act is
the sole source of section 1981. The failure of the redactors to mention
section 18 of the 1870 Act, which readopted the 1860 Act, has lead some
courts to conclude that section 1981 reaches only state discrimination
73. See Runyon, 427 U.S. at 168-72; Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 436 (1968).
The Supreme Court recently ended considerable confusion when it defined "race" in terms of
§ 1981. Prior to its decision in Saint Francis College v. AI-Khazraji, 107 S. Ct. 2022 (1987), many
courts had interpreted § 1981 quite literally. They had held that only claims alleging race discrimi-
nation were justiciable. See, e.g., Martinez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 78 F.R.D. 125, 129 (E.D. Pa.
1987); Jones v. United Gas Improvement Corp., 68 F.R.D. 1, 15 (E.D. Pa. 1975). The difficulties
presented by this approach were obvious and manifested themselves in situations in which courts
were confronted with claims of alleged national origin discrimination from individuals not "scien-
tifically" classified in a distinct race from the defendant. For example, a Caucasian Hispanic would
fail to state a cause of action under § 1981 against an Anglo because the term Hispanic is a taxo-
nomic device covering people of a Spanish culture or origin regardless of race. Cf. 49 C.F.R. § 23.5
(1987) (defining the term Hispanic). In short, the classification of an individual as "Hispanic" is
one based on ethnicity and not race. Those courts that strictly read the racial requirement into §
1981, therefore, would not allow any claims that alleged discrimination because of one's Hispanic
background. See Note, National Origin Discrimination Under Section 1981, 51 FORDHAm L. REv.
919, 920-28 (1983).
The Supreme Court resolved this problem when it held that racial discrimination within the
meaning of § 1981 would encompass those classifications that were considered "racial" at the time
of § 1981's enactment. Saint Francis College, 107 S. Ct. at 2028. As Justice Brennan pointed out in
his concurrence in Saint Francis College, however, the Court did not read out of § 1981 its "race"
requirement but merely broadened its scope. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring). Thus, an allegation of
discrimination "based on birthplace alone is insufficient to state a claim under ... § 1981." Id. at
2029 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). The plaintiff must prove more than discrimi-
nation based on ancestry, she must prove discrimination based on ethnicity. As a result, § 1981
remains an insignificant weapon against discrimination based on citizenship status unless a citizen-
ship requirement is a subterfuge for "racial" discrimination.
If a citizenship requirement is a mask for racial discrimination, then § 1981 will suffice to
protect the interest of the victims. However, Congress' concern in enacting § 274B was not with
the racist who refuses to hire "non-whites," but rather the employer who is fearful of being cited
for violating the IRCA's prohibition against employment of undocumented workers. Section 1981
proves of little use against these fearful employers.
74. See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172-73 (1972) (holding state action
is necessary for a violation of the fourteenth amendment).
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against aliens.
The seminal case cited for the proposition that private alienage dis-
crimination is justiciable under section 1981 recently has been over-
turned. In Bhandari v. First National Bank of Commerce7 5 the
appellee bank denied the appellant credit in part because he was not a
United States citizen. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit re-
versed twelve years of precedent when it held that section 1981 did not
prohibit private discrimination based on alienage.7 1 In reaching its con-
clusion, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that section 1981 is derived solely
from section 16 of the Civil Rights Act of 1870, which itself was enacted
in conjunction with the fourteenth amendment, thus prohibiting only
state discrimination against aliens."
In Espinoza v. HilIwood Square Mutual Association5 a United
States district court adopted a different reading of the legislative his-
tory of section 1981. The Espinoza court reasoned that section 16 of the
1870 Act was intended to protect aliens from alienage discrimination to
the same extent that section 1 of the 1866 Act was intended to protect
citizens from racial discrimination. Section 1 prohibited private and
state racial discrimination, therefore section 16 also prohibited private
and state alienage discrimination. 9
The Espinoza court's reasoning, while entirely plausible, has not
won many converts. And, if Bhandari portends the future, section
1981's capacity to guard against private alienage discrimination is
doubtful. Victims of alienage discrimination will have to look elsewhere
to redress their claims.
B. Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196480 introduced a comprehen-
sive scheme designed to prohibit and remedy employment discrimina-
75. 829 F.2d 1343 (5th Cir. 1987).
76. The Fifth Circuit's ruling in Bhandari overturned its earlier holding in Guerra v.
Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974). Guerra held that private discrimination
against aliens was redressable under § 1981.
77. Bhandari, 829 F.2d at 1349-51. The Bhandari court essentially followed the dissent in
Runyon. In a lengthy dissenting opinion in Runyon, Justice White stated that § 1981 was enacted
pursuant to the fourteenth amendment and did not reach private discrimination. To hold other-
wise, he said, "would result in confusion, by extending to one class of persons (blacks) a right not
to be discriminated against by private individuals, while another class of persons (aliens) would be
given no such protection by the same language." Runyon, 427 U.S. at 206 (White, J., dissenting).
Justice White's position proceeds on the assumption that § 1981 is derived from § 16 of the 1870
Act.
78. 522 F. Supp. 559 (E.D. Va. 1981).
79. Id. at 564.
80. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
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tion 1 The Supreme Court has stated that the primary objective of
Title VII is "to achieve equality of employment opportunities and re-
move barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable
group of white employees over other employees. 8 2 The mandate given
courts by Title VII, therefore, is to establish theories of liability and
standards of proof that operate to prohibit discriminatory practice.8" In
response to this mandate, courts have established a number of diver-
gent theories of liability and corresponding standards of proof.8 4 How-
ever, while Title VII jurisprudence is quite expansive, it is not all-
encompassing.8 5
Section 703 of Title VII makes it unlawful for public and private
employers,88 labor unions, and employment agencies8 7 to discriminate
against any individual on the basis of race, religion, color, sex, or na-
tional origin. 8 Critics of the IRCA's section 274B argue that Title VII's
81. See S. REP. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 2355 [hereinafter 1964 U.S. CODE]. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary in reporting the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 to the full Senate stated that: "The purpose of [this act] is to achieve a
peaceful and voluntary settlement of the persistent problem of racial ... discrimination or segre-
gation by establishments doing business with the general public, and by labor unions and profes-
sional, business, and trade associations." Id. at 1, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE, supra, at 2355.
In reporting the 1964 Act to the full House of Representatives, the House Committee on the
Judiciary said of Title VII in particular: "The purpose of this title is to eliminate, through the
utilization of formal and informal remedial procedures, discrimination in employment. " H.R.
REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE, supra, at 2401.
82. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
83. Id. at 431 (stating that "[w]hat is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbi-
trary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discrimi-
nate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classifications").
84. See generally C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RIcHARD, FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF EM-
PLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 1-69 (1980).
85. See H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 46, pt. 1, at 70, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE, supra
note 46, at 5674. In reporting the IRCA to the full House, the Judiciary Committee reiterated this
concern when it stated:
It makes no sense to admit immigrants and refugees to this country, require them to work
and then allow employers to refuse to hire them because of their immigration (non-citizen-
ship) status. Since Title VII does not provide any protection against employment discrimina-
tion based on alienage or non-citizen status, the Committee is of the view that the instant
legislation must do so.
Id. (parentheses in original).
86. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (Title VII applied to state govern-
ment); Griggs, 401 U.S. 424 (Title VII applied to private employer).
87. See, e.g., Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 678 F.2d 992 (11th Cir. 1982) (applying
Title VII to unions). The statutory language of Title VII expressly includes employment agencies.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (1982).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982). Section 703(a) reads in part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
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prohibition against national origin discrimination is sufficiently broad
to allay the fears of those who believe that employer sanctions will re-
sult in unfair labor practices.89 The critics' argument is based on the
assumption that alienage discrimination is, in essence, a subset of na-
tional origin discrimination. Believing that no meaningful distinction
exists between citizenship discrimination and national origin discrimi-
nation, these critics conclude that section 274B is unnecessary."0 These
critics specifically point to the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission's (EEOC) guidelines that prohibit discrimination based on citi-
zenship if the "purpose or effect" of a citizenship requirement is to
exclude individuals on the basis of their national origin", and they ar-
gue that the EEOC has an established bureaucracy with expertise in
enforcing claims of national origin discrimination. Thus, they conclude
that the alien already enjoys significant protections.2
This conclusion is questionable. A more precise inquiry into the
law reveals that aliens do not enjoy significant protections and, more-
over, that a cognizable difference exists between discrimination based
on alienage and discrimination based on national origin. In the
landmark case of Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co.93 the Supreme
Court held that an employer's refusal to hire aliens did not violate Title
VII prohibitions against national origin discrimination.9 The Espinoza
Court refused to accept the proposition that discrimination based on
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or other-
wise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
89. See H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 46, pt. 1, at 216, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE, supra
note 46, at 5752 (statement of Rep. Lungran).
90. Joint Hearing, supra note 48, at 212 (statement of Paul Grossman).
91. [1987] EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 1 622.2, at 3801.
92. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 46, pt. 2, at 47, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE, supra note 46,
at 5786 (minority views on the IRCA), The minority view concluded:
We can see no reason why a new office of Special Counsel is necessary for the enforcement of
these anti-discrimination provisions. With the EEOC, we already have an agency with the
expertise and personnel for enforcement of national origin discrimination claims. Citizenship
claims are so similar to national origin claims that they, too, should be enforced by the EEOC.
The New Office of Special Counsel is unnecessarily duplicative and expensive.
Id.
Notwithstanding these comments, over the past few years the EEOC has shown a disinterest
in pursuing claims of national origin discrimination. See 130 CONG. Rac. H5625 (daily ed. June 12,
1984)(statement of Rep. Garcia) (discussing the percentage of national origin cases which the
EEOC has filed). Given the agency's recent de-emphasis, Congress was well advised to seek protec-
tion for the alien elsewhere. See Days, Turning Back the Clock: The Reagan Administration and
Civil Rights, 19 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 309 (1984) (discussing the attitude of the Reagan adminis-
tration toward civil rights enforcement).
93. 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
94. Id. at 95.
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alienage was per se national origin discrimination when it ruled that in
order to state a claim under Title VII the alien must have demonstrated
that the employer's citizenship requirement "ha[d] the purpose or ef-
fect of discriminating on the basis of national origin."95 The Court con-
cluded that the term "national origin," as used in Title VII, did not
embrace citizenship but, rather, referred to the country where a person
was born, or, more broadly, to the country from where her ancestors
came."6 Thus, an employer legitimately can refuse to hire a legally ad-
mitted alien on the basis of citizenship, so long as citizenship is not a
pretext for discrimination based on national origin.
The holding in Espinoza is especially problematic in cases in which
the alien who is refused employment is of the same ancestry or country
as a majority of the employer's work force. In this situation a citizen-
ship requirement would have the "purpose and effect" of not discrimi-
nating on the basis of national origin, but on the basis of alienage.9 7
This kind of discrimination is not prohibited by Title VII.
Moreover, Title VII exempts from its coverage both small and sea-
sonal employers.9 8 The statute provides that an employer must employ
fifteen or more employees during twenty or more calendar weeks in
each year in order to fall within its purview.9 The obvious effect of this
requirement is to provide an exemption from Title VII for those em-
ployers who hire hundreds of workers on a seasonal basis of less than
twenty calendar weeks a year. Because a large percentage of the most
likely beneficiaries of the IRCA are concentrated in industries that are
seasonal in nature, the ability of Title VII to protect these individuals is
doubtful. In response to this void in existing antidiscrimination law,
Congress enacted section 274B of the IRCA. As the Espinoza Court
made imminently clear, Title VII is ineffective in remedying alienage
discrimination because its prophylactic provisions do not prohibit dis-
crimination based on citizenship status. The effect of section 274B is,
therefore, a congressional rejection of Espinoza' and, thereby, an ex-
tension of Title VII to a class of individuals previously not protected.
The Act also addresses the uncertainty created by the Fifth Circuit
95. Id. at 92.
96. Id. at 89.
97. The facts of Espinoza are illustrative. The respondent refused to employ the petitioner
on the basis of a long-standing company policy that forbade the employment of noncitizens. The
petitioner challenged the policy alleging that it discriminated against her on the basis of her na-
tional origin. In denying the prayed for relief, the Court noted that over 96% of the respondent's
employees were of the same ethnic origin as the petitioner; thus, the policy of refusing noncitizens
jobs did not have the "purpose or effect" of discrimination on the basis of national origin. Id. at 93.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982).
99. Id.
100. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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with its recent decision in Bhandari.1 1 Bhandari held that private
alienage discrimination was no longer justiciable under section 1981.102
In response, the antidiscrimination provision of the IRCA provides an
alternative cause of action independent of section 1981.
The Act's success, however, will depend ultimately on the theory of
antidiscrimination law that the courts choose to apply. Unfortunately,
the statute is silent regarding this choice. If a court adopts the dispa-
rate treatment theory, the intended beneficiaries of section 274B may
find proof of discrimination difficult to establish and, consequently, the
statute's substantive protections elusive. Alternatively, if a court adopts
the disparate impact theory, proof of discrimination would be signifi-
cantly less problematic, and the full panoply of protections embodied in
section 274B would be more readily available.
IV. TITLE VII THEORIES OF LIABILITY
In construing the IRCA President Reagan stated that section 274B
required a showing of deliberate discriminatory intent. Invoking Title
VII disparate treatment jurisprudence, the President indicated that un-
less evidence of intentional discrimination is established, the plaintiff
has not stated a cause of action under the Act's antidiscrimination pro-
vision.103 In embracing the disparate treatment standard of proof, Pres-
ident Reagan expressly rejected Title VII's disparate impact doctrine,'
which does not require a showing of discriminatory intent.'
Opponents0 6 of this view maintain that the President's reading of
the statute is wrong. They believe that the President failed to distin-
guish between the private right of action, which requires the plaintiff to
allege either "knowing and intentional discriminatory activity or a pat-
tern or practice of discriminatory activity,' 0 7 and the Special Counsel's
right of action,108 which has no similar statutory language.
The "knowing and intentional" language clearly invokes a dispa-
rate treatment standard. However, the proper interpretation of the
"pattern or practice" language has caused some debate. President Rea-
101. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
103. Signing Statement, supra note 2, at 1535.
104. Id. (stating that "I understand section 274B to require a 'discriminatory intent' stan-
dard of proof ... [t]hus, it would be improper to use the disparate impact theory of recovery").
105. Unlike the disparate treatment cases, under a disparate impact theory proof of discrimi-
natory intent need not be shown. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977); see also infra notes 127-41 and accompanying text.
106. The President faces opposition from members of Congress, Hispanic groups, and civil
rights organizations. See infra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
107. IRCA, supra note 1, § 274B(d)(2), at 3376.
108. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
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gan has argued that the term "pattern or practice" mandates a demon-
stration of intent," 9 while Representative Frank, the author of section
274B, has insisted that "pattern or practice" suits do not require proof
of discriminatory motive.110 The focus of the debate surrounding the
appropriate standard of proof centers on President Reagan's insistence
that the disparate treatment language of the private right of action is a
general requirement of the entire antidiscrimination provision, includ-
ing the Special Counsel's right of action.
A. Disparate Treatment
Disparate treatment exists when an employer intentionally treats
some people less favorably than others because of their group status.1
The Supreme Court has set forth a tripartite allocation and order of
proof to be used in cases alleging disparate treatment.' First, the
plaintiff must establish a prima facie case. Second, the employer must
come forward with evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason
for its actions. Finally, the plaintiff must be given the opportunity to
prove that the alleged nondiscriminatory reason is merely a pretext for
unlawful discrimination.1 '
To establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination under
Title VII disparate treatment theory, the plaintiff must show by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence:1 14 (1) that the plaintiff is a member of a
protected class; (2) that the plaintiff applied and was qualified for a job
for which the defendant was seeking applications; (3) that the applica-
tion was rejected; and (4) that following the rejection the job remained
open and applications were sought from persons with the plaintiff's
qualifications.11 5
Once a prima facie case is established, it creates a presumption of
discrimination.11 6 The burden of production shifts to the defendant to
articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff's rejec-
109. Signing Statement, supra note 2, at 1535.
110. N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1986, at 14B, col. 1. Representative Frank appears to be wrong in
this regard. See infra notes 142-53 and accompanying text.
111. See, e.g., Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); see also Teamsters, 431
U.S. at 335 n.15.
112. See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
113. Id. at 252 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).
114. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53.
115. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
116. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. The Court in Burdine stated:
Establishment of a prima facie case in effect creates a presumption that the employer unlaw-
fully discriminated against the employee. If the trier of fact believes the plaintiff's evidence,
and if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgement
for the plaintiff because no issue of fact remains in the case.
Id. (footnote omitted).
1988] 1339
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1323
tion.117 The defendant does not need to convince the court that she ac-
tually was motivated by the proffered reason."' It is sufficient if the
defendant's admissible evidence raises a genuine issue of fact regarding
discrimination against the plaintiff.11 9 The employer only needs to pro-
duce such admissable evidence as would allow the fact finder rationally
to conclude that the employment decision was not motivated by dis-
criminatory intent.2 However, the explanation provided must be le-
gally sufficient to justify a finding in favor of the defendant.
12 1
If the defendant succeeds in rebutting the presumption of discrimi-
nation, the plaintiff must then show by a preponderance of evidence
that the proffered reason of the defendant is simply a pretext for inten-
tional discrimination. 12 2 This burden may be accomplished by the intro-
duction of either statistical or inferential evidence1 23 showing that the
defendant's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence and is a sub-
terfuge for intentional discrimination.2 At all times the ultimate bur-
den of proving that the defendant acted intentionally remains with the
plaintiff,12 5 who must show that discrimination was a "but for" factor in
the defendant's decision.
1 26
117. Id. at 254; see also McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
118. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 (citing Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeny,
439 U.S. 24, 25 (1978)).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 257.
121. Id. at 255; see also Belton, Discrimination and Affirmative Action: An Analysis of Com-
peting Theories of Equality and Weber, 59 N.C.L. REv. 531, 556 & n.106 (1981).
122. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. The burden of proving pretext "merges with the ultimate
burden of persuading the court that [the plaintiff] has been the victim of intentional discrimina-
tion." Id. Pretext as used in this context does not mean that the plaintiff must show that she was
rejected because of race; rather, the plaintiff is required to prove only that race was a factor in the
decision. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282 n.10 (1976).
123. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05; see also D. BALDUS & J. COLE, STATISTICAL
PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION (1980). Law review commentary on burden of proof issues is quite exten-
sive. See generally Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discriminatory Cases: Toward a
Theory of Procedural Justice, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1205 (1981); Edwards, Direct Evidence of Discrim-
inatory Intent and the Burden of Proof: An Analysis and Critique, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1
(1986).
124. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256; see also Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459, 464-65
(9th Cir. 1983) (police department rejected female applicant allegedly due to lack of aggressive-
ness, self-assuredness, or probable physical ability; consequently, pretext was established by both
direct and indirect evidence that rejection actually was based on sex-biased stereotype of women),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 979 (1984).
125. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
126. Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910, 914-15 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 892 (1984).
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B. Disparate Impact
Disparate impact cases arise in situations in which an employer's
facially neutral policies have an adverse impact on a group protected by
Title VII.127 The goal of the disparate impact doctrine is to eliminate
the discriminatory effect produced by the evenhanded application of se-
lection standards, if those standards are not job related. The seminal
case articulating disparate impact theory is Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 128
In Griggs the plaintiffs, black employees of Duke Power, challenged
the defendant's policy of requiring either a high school diploma or a
minimum score on an aptitude test as a prerequisite of employment for,
or transfer to, certain jobs in the company.12 9 There was no finding that
the defendant's diploma or test requirement was motivated by discrimi-
natory intent.130 Nevertheless, the plaintiffs' statistical evidence estab-
lished that these requirements, though applied equally to blacks and
whites, disproportionately disqualified a substantially larger number of
blacks than whites. 1
The Court found Duke Power's diploma and testing requirements
discriminatory, reasoning that the requirements had no relationship to
job capability but, rather, operated as "built-in headwinds" to prevent
members of a protected class from securing attractive jobs within the
company. 13 2 Rejecting the argument that discriminatory intent must be
established in a disparate impact case,1 3 the Court said that Title VII
127. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.
128. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). For a general discussion of Griggs in terms of its impact on employ-
ment discrimination law, see Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the
Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REv. 59 (1972).
129. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 425-28. In Griggs the Court dealt with "the archetype of the subordi-
nation of black workers in the South." Blumrosen, supra note 128, at 63. Before the passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the respondent, Duke Power, had retained blacks in only the most menial
jobs. They were assigned to the labor department or to low level maintenance work; all other jobs
were reserved for whites. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427.
In 1955 Duke Power instituted a policy requiring a high school diploma for employment in
any department other than labor. On July 2, 1965, the effective date of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the respondent abandoned its policy of restricting blacks to the labor department, but re-
tained its requirement of a high school education for any job assignment other than labor. From
the time the high school requirement was instituted, however, white employees hired before the
institution of the educational requirement continued to be promoted. Id.
In 1965 the respondent began to permit incumbent employees who lacked high school educa-
tion to qualify for transfers by passing tests that purported to measure intelligence. On the basis of
these policies, a class action on behalf of all black employees of Duke Power was instituted. Id. at
427-28.
130. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 428-29.
131. Id. at 429.
132. Id. at 432.
133. While the classic formation of the disparate impact theory does not require proof of
discriminatory intent, see Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15, cases challenging the constitutionality
of a facially neutral law confront a different standard. It is well established doctrine that a consti-
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is directed at the consequences of employment practices as well as the
employer's motivations."' Thus, a showing of either good intent or dis-
criminatory intent is not dispositive. 5 The fact that the job require-
ments operated to exclude certain members of the work force unjustly
was sufficient to find that Duke Power had discriminated.
The order and allocation of the burden of proof under a theory of
disparate impact is a three-step evidentiary process. First, the plaintiff
must establish a prima facie case by showing that a substantially ad-
verse impact inures to a protected class from the defendant's facially
neutral policy. 6 If the plaintiff fails to meet this burden, the defendant
is entitled to a verdict at the close of the plaintiff's case. 37 Second, if
the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the de-
fendant to validate the policy by a strong showing 3 ' that it is either
related to job performance 9 or is a business necessity.1 40 If the defend-
tutional challenge to a facially neutral law whose application results in a disproportionate impact
requires proof of a racially discriminatory motive. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Jus-
tice Rehnquist reiterated this doctrine while writing for a unanimous Court in Hunter v. Under-
wood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
In Hunter a provision of the Alabama Constitution first enacted in 1901 was struck down as
violative of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 225. The provision required the disenfranchisement
of persons convicted of crimes involving "moral turpitude." In invalidating the provision, the jus-
tices noted that even though it was racially neutral on its face, its original intent nonetheless was
discriminatory in both adoption and application. Id. at 227-30. In so holding, the Court reaffirmed
its earlier mandate that proof of discriminatory motive is a prerequisite for establishing the uncon-
stitutionality of a facially neutral law whose application is discriminatory in impact. Id. at 227-28.
The Washington v. Davis doctrine has been condemned widely by civil rights activists and
constitutional scholars who argue that proof of discriminatory intent is particularly problematic
and, more fundamentally, that the injury of racial inequality exists irrespective of motive. See
Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN.
L. REv. 317, 318-20 & nn.4-7 (1987). Supporters of the doctrine are equally vociferous in proclaim-
ing the doctrine's propriety by appealing to what amounts to a "slippery slope" argument. Id. at
320 & nn.9-13. The Supreme Court has shown little inclination to reverse the doctrine that it
carved out with its holding in Washington v. Davis.
134. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432; see also Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.
135. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
136. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). To be legally cognizable
the disparity must be significantly discriminatory-at a minimum the percentages must be mark-
edly disproportionate. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328-30 (1977).
137. Amey v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1477, 1482 (N.D. Ga.
1980) (judgment for defendant at close of plaintiff's case because of failure to prove significant
statistical disparities).
138. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.) (stating that "the business
purpose must be sufficiently compelling to override any racial impact; the challenged practice must
effectively carry out the business purpose it is alleged to serve; and there must be available no
acceptable alternative policies or practices which would better accomplish the business purpose
advanced" (footnotes omitted)), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
139. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. There is considerable confusion regarding the exact mean-
ing of the term "related to job performance" in referring to the defendant's burden. It has been
suggested that the defendant's burden of proving job relatedness is a heavy one. Kirkland v. New
York State Dep't of Correctional Serv., 520 F.2d 420, 426 (2nd Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
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ant fails in establishing either of these defenses, the policy should be
adjudged a violation of Title VII. Third, should the defendant succeed
in establishing a defense, the plaintiff is given the opportunity to show
that alternative policies with less differential impact on the protected
class are available and would serve the legitimate business needs of the
defendant employer.
14 '
C. Pattern or Practice Suits
Litigants bringing a claim under the IRCA's private right of action
are required to prove either intentional discrimination or a pattern or
practice of discriminatory activity. 142 The Act does not define "pattern
or practice" but defers to judicial interpretation of the phrase. 4 s Be-
cause the phrase is found in numerous civil rights laws, including Title
VII,"44 it has received substantial judicial construction. The phrase
"pattern or practice" has been construed by courts as encompassing ac-
tivities that are "'repeated, routine, or of a generalized nature.' "'145
Pattern or practice suits almost always involve claims of class-wide
discrimination. Typically, the defendant is alleged to have treated a
823 (1976). The "job related" defense is invoked most often in cases challenging the validity of
testing procedures. In addressing the burden of proof question, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit concluded that a job-related exam whose passing percentage excluded a disproportionately
larger number of protected class members was discriminatory unless it could be established by
professionally accepted methods to have been predictive of job performance or relevant to job
selection. Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1276 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 1021 (1982).
140. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. The parameters of the business necessity defense are not de-
fined clearly. Much of the confusion stems from the courts' use of the terms "business necessity"
and "job relatedness" in a synonymous fashion. In Griggs for example, the Court stated: "[Title
VII] proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discrimi-
natory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which oper-
ates to exclude [blacks] cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is
prohibited." Id. (emphasis added).
It is suggested by some commentators that the terms are not synonymous, but rather that
business necessity is broader than job relatedness, and that job relatedness is a subset of business
necessity. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1328-29 (2d ed. 1983).
The test generally articulated to determine if one has a legitimate business necessity defense is
"whether there exists an overriding legitimate business purpose such that the practice is necessary
to the safe and efficient operation of the business." Robinson, 444 F.2d at 798; see also Note,
Business Necessity: Judicial Dualism and the Search for Adequate Standards, 15 GA. L. REv. 376,
388-89 (1981).
141. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425.
142. IRCA, supra note 1, § 274B(d)(2), at 3376.
143. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 46, pt. 1, at 59, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE, supra note
46, at 5663.
144. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1982); see also Voting Rights Act of 1965,
42 U.S.C. § 1971-1974e (1982); Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601-3631 (1982).
145. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336 n.16 (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 14,270 (1964)).
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protected group in an intentionally discriminatory manner.14 6 The Su-
preme Court, therefore, requires plaintiffs to prove more than the oc-
currence of a single insignificant act of discrimination. 147 They must
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's
discriminatory policy was "standard operating procedure-the regular
rather than the unusual practice.' 48 Statistical evidence indicating sig-
nificant disparity between the percentage of a protected group's repre-
sentation in the general population and its representation in the
defendant's labor force may be introduced to carry this burden. 49 This
evidence establishes an inference that an intentional discriminatory
policy exists.150
The plaintiff, at the prima facie level, is not required to prove that
each person for whom relief is sought is a victim of the employer's dis-
criminatory policy.15' A presumption exists that any employment deci-
sion made during the period when the discriminatory policy was in
effect was made in furtherance of that policy.15 The defendant can re-
but the presumption raised by the prima facie case by showing that the
plaintiff's statistical proof of a pattern of discrimination either is flawed
or statistically insignificant.
153
V. INTENT VS. IMPAci A COMPARISON
The state of mind of the defendant is irrelevant in a disparate im-
pact model. The sole issue at the prima facie level is the effect that the
defendant's policies have on a protected class. Practices that are neutral
on their face, but which result in a disproportionate adverse impact,
violate Title VII in the absence of a justifiable defense. Thus, without
inquiring into the defendant's motivations, courts have enjoined the use
146. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 303 (1977); Teamsters, 431
U.S. at 335.
147. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336; see also United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d
544, 552 (9th Cir.) (pattern or practice is found "where the acts of discrimination are not 'isolated,
peculiar or accidental' "), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971).
148. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336.
149. United States v. City of Alexandria, 614 F.2d 1358, 1364 (5th Cir. 1980); see also Pett-
way v. American Cast Iron Workers Local 86, 494 F.2d 211, 225 n.34 (5th Cir. 1974) (stating that
statistics may be used to establish a prima facie case in pattern or practice actions), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1115 (1979). The use of statistical evidence is not without its difficulties. See generally B.
SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 140, at 1331-94.
150. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 359.
151. Id. at 360.
152. Id. at 362 (stating that "[t]he proof of the pattern or practice supports the inference
that any particular employment decision, during the period in which the discriminatory policy was
in force, was made in pursuit of that policy").
153. Id. at 360.
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of minimum height and weight requirements,5 standardized intelli-
gence tests,'15 diploma requirements, 5 6 and a host of other facially neu-
tral employment practices. 57 In establishing a prima facie disparate
impact case, moreover, the traditional elements of causation generally
are not an issue. Evidence of statistical disparity is itself proof of a
causal link between the challenged procedure and the discriminatory
result.
15
In sharp contrast to disparate impact are pattern or practice suits
and disparate treatment suits. In each suit an inquiry into the defend-
ant's state of mind is required in order to show intentional discrimina-
tion. 1 59 To carry this burden of proof, the plaintiff must establish that
the defendant intended to discriminate against a protected group.6 0
Statistical disparity between groups, while not wholly irrelevant to
proof of discriminatory intent, normally will not itself evidence such
intent.'' Only in cases of egregiously unequal impact, when the only
explanation is discrimination, will impact alone be determinative of
intent.1
6 2
Given that invidious discrimination often manifests itself in more
subtle forms than overt prejudice, proof of discriminatory motive is ex-
ceedingly difficult. As one commentator has observed, the process of
proving intent produces a series of onerous specifications, as individual
cases become involved in the vagaries of fact-finding in an attempt to
154. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
155. See United States v. Georgia Power, 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973).
156. See Griggs, 401 U.S. 424.
157. See, e.g., Andrews v. Drew Mun. Separate School Dist., 371 F. Supp. 27 (N.D. Miss.
1973) (treating unwed parenthood as immoral, and therefore a basis for employment denial, has
disproportionate impact on minorities and females), aff'd, 507 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1975); Weeks v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969) (employer failed to prove that the require-
ment of a switchman's position demanded lifting duties that were so strenuous that all or most
women would be unable to perform them).
158. See Lewis v. Bloomsburg Mills Inc., 773 F.2d 561, 571 n.16 (4th Cir. 1985).
159. See, e.g., Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982) (disparate treatment); Hazel-
wood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977) (pattern or practice).
160. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 717 (1983) (Black-
mun, J., concurring); see Note, Discriminatory Purpose and Mens Rea: The Tortured Argument
of Invidious Intent, 93 YALE L.J. 111, 122 n.66 (1983) (stating that "'"[d]iscriminatory purpose"
* . . implies that the decisionmakers . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at
least in part "because of," not merely "in spite of," its adverse effects upon an identifiable
group.'" (quoting Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979))).
161. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-67 (1977).
162. Id. The Arlington Heights Court cited Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), as an
example in which the disparity was so stark as to lead to only one conclusion: the defendant in-
tended to discriminate. In Hopkins California had enacted a law prohibiting laundries in any
building made of wood. The effect of this law was to eliminate virtually every Chinese laundry in
California. The Court quickly pointed out that instances of such stark disparity are quite infre-
quent. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
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reveal the employer's state of mind.1 63 The day of the bigoted employer
who openly avows disdain for a particular group of individuals is wan-
ing; instead, discrimination is infinitely more sophisticated. Take, for
example, the corporate employer who has a policy that all applicants
for employment weigh at least 120 pounds. The policy has been in ef-
fect since the formation of the company and is applied equally to all
individuals regardless of gender or race. The weight policy is challenged
by an otherwise qualified female who is rejected because of it. The
plaintiff is able to introduce statistical evidence that the policy operates
to exclude twenty percent of all female applicants compared with six
percent of all male applicants. No evidence is introduced that the policy
is intentionally discriminatory, and the defendant is unable to justify it
based on a business necessity.
Under the Griggs model of disparate impact, by introducing this
statistical evidence the plaintiff has established a prima facie violation
of Title VII. Under a disparate treatment standard, however, no viola-
tion has occurred because the relatively minimal disparity between
male and female applicants would not approach the egregiously dispro-
portionate level,164 and there would not be other evidence of discrimina-
tory intent because the policy was applied to all employees. Thus, the
policy would stand.
Because of the subconscious'6 5 and institutionalized 6 6 nature of
163. Blumrosen, supra note 128, at 68; see United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 573
F.2d 400, 412 (7th Cir.) (stating that "in an age when it is unfashionable . . . to openly express
racial hostility, direct evidence of overt bigotry will be impossible to find"), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
824 (1978).
164. See supra note 162.
165. Lawrence, supra note 133, at 323. The subconscious, as it relates to racism, has been
described as follows:
The individual is unaware. that the ubiquitous presence of a cultural stereotype has influ-
enced her perception. . .. Because racism is so deeply ingrained in our culture, it is likely to
be transmitted by tacit understandings: Even if a child is not told that blacks are inferior,
[s]he learns that lesson by observing the behavior of others. These tacit understandings, be-
cause they have never been articulated, are less likely to be experienced at a conscious level.
Id.
166. Institutionalized discrimination results from practices that create an environment in
which negative stereotypes are fostered and continue causing injuries even after those practices
have stopped. See Schnapper, Perpetuation of Past Discrimination, 96 HARv. L. REv. 828, 855-58
(1983). The discriminatory comments based on gender or race that are heard every day are evi-
dence of the continuing impact of these past policies. These negative stereotypes, then, are mani-
fested in the superstructure undergirding society and operate in many instances to retard the full
involvement of women and minorities in the political and social process.
While institutionalized discrimination is not necessarily intentional, its manifestations, never-
theless, disrupt society. As Professor Eric Schnapper has observed:
The essence of effective racial discrimination was and remains the creation of rules and cir-
cumstances that minimize the necessity for new acts of intentional discrimination. Once such
a system has been established, all that is accomplished by forbidding further intentional dis-
crimination is interference with the ability of biased officials to fine tune the system and
1346
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contemporary prejudice, and the pervasive use of facially neutral poli-
cies, proof of intentional discrimination is an arduous task. In response
to these discrete forms of discrimination, the courts have articulated
the doctrine of disparate impact. Under this theory evidence of impact
is easier to show than proof of intent, but, more importantly, it affords
adequate safeguards against the stealth of modern discrimination.
VI. A MATTER OF MISINFORMED INTERPRETATION
At the time President Reagan signed the IRCA into law, he issued
a statement asserting that section 274B required a showing of disparate
treatment and not disparate impact.16 7 Arguing that the "knowing and
intentional" and "pattern or practice" language associated with the pri-
vate right of action applied equally to the Special Counsel, the Presi-
dent read the IRCA as requiring proof of discriminatory motive in any
action whether by the Special Counsel or by the private litigant.168
President Reagan's reading of section 274B is quite narrow. He would
extract from the IRCA's antidiscrimination provision all Title VII dis-
parate impact theory.
Sentiment against the President's position is unified and vehement.
Members of Congress, 16 9 Hispanic groups,1 70 and civil rights organiza-
adapt it to unforeseen developments.
Id. at 863, quoted in Welch, Removing Discriminatory Barriers: Basing Disparate Treatment
Analysis on Motive Rather than Intent, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 747 (1987).
167. Signing Statement, supra note 2, at 1535. The President's Signing Statement stated:
Thus, a facially neutral employee selection practice that is employed without discriminatory
intent will be permissible under the provisions of section 274B. For example, the section does
not preclude a requirement of English language skill or a minimum score on an aptitude test
even if the employer cannot show a "manifest relationship" to the job in question or that the
requirement is a "bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise," so long as the practice is not a guise used
to discriminate on account of national origin or citizenship status. Indeed, unless the plaintiff
presents evidence that the employer has intentionally discriminated on proscribed grounds,
the employer need not offer any explanation for his employee selection procedures.
Id. (emphasis in original).
168. Id. at 1535. The President's statement added that "I understand section 274B to require
a 'discriminatory intent' standard of proof: The party bringing the action must show that in the
decision making process the defendant's action was motivated by one of the prohibited criterion.
Thus it would be improper to use the 'disparate impact' theory of recovery. . . ." Id.
169. See generally Implementation of Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986: Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the House Comm.
of the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1986) (statement of Rep. Frank) [hereinafter Imple-
mentation]; N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1986, at B14, col. 3 (in which Rep. Frank calls the President's
interpretation the "gravest usurpation of legislative prerogative" he has ever witnessed).
170. N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1986, at 34, col. 4 (city ed.) (E. Richard Larsons, Vice President of
the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund) (stating that "[tihe President's inter-
pretation of the law would severely undercut the protections against discrimination that Congress
provided"). Representative Esteban Edward Torres, Chairperson of the Congressional Hispanic
Caucus, echoed Mr. Larson's view and added that he was "appalled at the President's interpreta-
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tions' 7 ' are united in their opposition to the President's interpretation.
They insist that the President's views are myopic and ill-conceived.'
While it generally is conceded that the private right of action is limited
by its language to cases alleging disparate treatment discrimination,
these groups insist that the same limitations should not apply to the
Special Counsel. Substantively restricting the Special Counsel's right of
action to cases alleging only intentional discrimination would eviscerate
congressional intent and would set a dangerous precedent for civil-
rights law.
President Reagan makes his case for a disparate treatment stan-
dard by building upon congressional intent to model the IRCA on Title
VII. Believing Title VII section 703(a)(1) to be the sole source for the
IRCA's antidiscrimination provision and the basis of disparate treat-
ment theory, the President concluded that section 274B requires a
showing of discriminatory intent.17 The President then concluded that
disparate impact theory is inappropriate in section 274B analysis. In
reaching this conclusion, the President first posited that disparate im-
pact is rooted in section 703(a)(2) of Title VII.17 4 He then argued that
this provision of Title VII has no counterpart in the IRCA and that,
therefore, unintended acts of discrimination are not prohibited by sec-
tion 274B.1
7 5
Even if the antidiscrimination provision is modeled on section
703(a) (1), the President's conclusions are faulty. No court expressly has
tied disparate treatment discrimination solely to 703(a)(1),'7 and the
Supreme Court has yet to decide whether subsection (a)(1) of Title VII,
like (a)(2), allows a suit based on disparate impact.
77
In Colby v. J.C. Penney Co. 17 8 the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals recently addressed the issue of whether 703(a)(1) can sustain a
tion of the anti-discrimination provisions." Id. at 1, col. 1.
171. See Guttentag, supra note 13, at 22 (noting that representatives from the National Law-
yers Guild called the President's statement illogical).
172. N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1986, at 1, col. 1 (city ed.).
173. See supra note 88 for text of 703(a)(1).
174. See supra note 88 for text of 703(a)(2).
175. Signing Statement, supra note 2, at 1535.
176. Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1126-27 (7th Cir. 1987).
177. See, e.g., Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 144 (1977) (stating that the Court
"need not decide whether, when confronted by a facially neutral plan, it is necessary to prove
intent to establish a prima facie violation of § 703(a)(1)"); cf. Wambheim v. J.C. Penney Co., 705
F.2d 1492, 1494 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that disparate impact analysis is appropriate in
§ 703(a)(1) but giving no reason in support), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1255 (1984); Bonilla v. Oakland
Scavenger Co., 697 F.2d 1297, 1302-04 (9th Cir.) (applying disparate impact analysis to a
§ 703(a)(1) case), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1255 (1984). But see Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440
(1982) (implying that § 703(a)(1) does not state a claim under disparate impact); EEOC v. J.C.
Penney Co., 632 F. Supp. 871, 874 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
178. 811 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1987).
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cause of action based on disparate impact. In ruling that it could, the
court acknowledged that the difference between the two sections is far
from clear. The court stated that to allow disparate impact under sub-
section (a)(2), but not under (a)(1), would generate complex litigation
and pressure to interpret (a)(2) expansively, thereby bringing within
(a)(2)'s ambit claims normally covered by subsection (a)(1). 17 9 Beyond
the difficulties envisioned by the Colby court, an analysis of the statu-
tory language contained in paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 703(a) pro-
vides an additional critique of the President's position.
Paragraph (1) proscribes discrimination in the context of hiring,
discharge, compensation, and conditions of employment.180 Paragraph
(2) prohibits the classification of employees and the deprivation of em-
ployment opportunities that adversely affect a protected group's sta-
tus.181 The prohibited basis of discrimination in either paragraph is
race, religion, sex and national origin. 18 2 Reduced to their essentials,
paragraphs (1) and (2) address the same evil, discrimination in employ-
ment. Indeed, the full statutory language of 703(a) appears redundant.
"Discrimination" in the first paragraph is modified by "compensa-
tion" and "conditions of employment," while "classify" in the second
paragraph is modified by "employment opportunities" and "adversely
affect." It is difficult to imagine a valid distinction between discrimina-
tion affecting compensation or conditions of employment, and classifi-
cations adversely impacting employment opportunities. Nevertheless,
some courts and the President have seized on the statutory bifurcation
and assigned to paragraph (1) the theory of disparate impact. The in-
congruity that this assignment creates is self-evident, particularly in
light of the evidentiary burdens that the defendant would encounter
when rebutting the prima facie case.
For example, a prima facie showing of disparate treatment may be
rebutted by articulating a nondiscriminatory reason for the employ-
ment decision. 83 This rebuttal faces a low level of judicial scrutiny. On
the other hand, a prima facie case alleging disparate impact may be
rebutted by establishing a "business necessity" defense."" This defense
encounters strict judicial scrutiny. It makes little sense if a discrimina-
tory rule or policy of an employer receives careful judicial review if it
affects employment opportunities, but not if it affects hiring or compen-
sation. The results of a rigid bifurcation between paragraphs (1) and (2)
179. Id. at 1127.
180. See supra note 88.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 140.
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are incongruous rulings at odds with the stated purposes of Title VII.
VII. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: A RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT
A. The Special Counsel's Right of Action
According to President Reagan, the substantive limitations associ-
ated with the private right of action are coterminous with the Special
Counsel. Thus, the power of the Special Counsel is delimited by the
capacity of the private right of action. Claims that fail to allege inten-
tional discrimination, therefore, are beyond the jurisdiction of the Spe-
cial Counsel and must be dismissed.185 The President's view is based
neither on section 274B, nor supported by its legislative history.
The Office of Special Counsel had its inception in the 98th Con-
gress. Representative Barney Frank proposed the Office as part of
amendment six to House Bill 1510.186 This amendment, entitled "Un-
fair Immigration-Related Employment Practices," passed the House by
an overwhelming majority.187 Though the Bill ultimately failed,188
amendment six reappeared in the IRCA with very little debate and to-
day constitutes section 274B. The scope of the Special Counsel's right
of action cannot be understood without first investigating the legislative
intent embodied in amendment six.
As proposed in House Bill 1510, the function of the Special Coun-
sel was to investigate claims of employment discrimination resulting
from employer sanctions.189 During the debate on amendment six, no
distinction was drawn between intentional and unintentional acts of
discrimination. Instead, the discussion reflected the concern of House
members that the Special Counsel be given sufficient latitude to deal
aggressively with any form of discrimination that might arise.1 90 The
Special Counsel's authority, therefore, was unlimited and unconstrained
by any requirements that discriminatory intent be established before a
cause of action could be mounted.
A provision for a private right of action also was included in
amendment six. As originally drafted, this right of action was undiffer-
185. IRCA, supra note 1, § 274B(b)(2), at 3375.
186. H.R. 1510, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REc. H5640-41 (daily ed. June 12, 1984).
187. Id. at H5644.
188. House Bill 1510 was tabled and set for reconsideration in the following Congress. Id. at
H6185.
189. Id. at H5643 (statement of Rep. Bartlett) (stating that "[tihe Special Counsel which the
amendment creates will be able to handle complaints concerning discrimination and to see to it
that the victims have redress").
190. Id. at H5641. The Bill's sponsor Representative Frank stated, "[w]hat we have if...
amendment [6] . . . is adopted [is] a readiness for any discrimination that might arise. It will be
an anticipatory remedy for any discrimination that might arise." Id. (emphasis added).
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entiated from the right of action enjoyed by the Special Counsel.191 The
only limitation on the private litigant was a requirement that she wait
until after the Special Counsel's statutory period of investigation had
expired before filing a complaint.192 Other than this limitation, the pri-
vate right of action was unfettered by any restrictions.
In the Senate, immigration reform took a different path with Sen-
ate Bill 529.193 While Senate Bill 529 established employer sanctions,
this companion bill to House Bill 1510 said nothing about unfair immi-
gration-related employment practices. Consequently, no provision ex-
isted for the formation of a Special Counsel. The Senate's failure to
acknowledge the possibility that sanctions would lead to discrimination
deeply troubled the House. Representative Garcia particularly was con-
cerned. He sought guarantees that the Office of Special Counsel would
be preserved during the upcoming Conference Committee with the Sen-
ate. Assurances that every effort would be made not to diminish the
Special Counsel's effectiveness were forthcoming.194
During the 1984 Conference Committee objections were raised that
the private right of action was too broad.'95 In response, the Committee
reached a compromise that limited the private litigant to cases alleging
intentional discrimination or a pattern or practice of discriminatory ac-
tivity.' By qualifying the private right of action, the conferees im-
posed a heavy evidentiary burden on those litigants who would bring
their own claims, and thereby substantially narrowed this right. The
compromise worked out in 1984 survives in section 274B of the IRCA.
As first introduced, the antidiscrimination provision did not distin-
191. Id. at H5640 (stating that if the Special Counsel, after "receiving ... a charge respect-
ing an unfair immigration-related employment practice, has not filed a complaint ... the person
making the charge may ... file a complaint directly").
192. Id.
193. S. 529, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. 86970-87 (daily ed. May 18, 1983).
194. H.R. 1510, supra note 186, at H5642. The following exchange took place among Repre-
sentatives Garcia, Mazzoli, and Rodino:
-Mr. Garcia.. . . If in fact we get to the conference committee, what assurances do we have
as a committee here that every effort is going to be made to make sure that if we pass this
bill, that the [Special Counsel] amendment is going to be included?
-Mr. Mazzoli.... I can assure my friend from New York that I will do my very best to
preserve the [Special Counsel] amendment and what it stands for, which is an ability to pur-
sue any unintended discrimination in the full conference product.
-Mr. Rodino.. .. I want to assure the gentleman that there will be no equivocation, there
will be no possible effort made by me or anyone else that will be represented by this side to
diminish this amendment's effectiveness.
Id.
195. Implementation, supra note 169, at 115 (statement of Rep. Frank).
196. Id. at 116.
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guish between the Special Counsel and the private litigant. Not until
the issue was considered by the Conference Committee was the private
right of action circumscribed by the inclusion of qualifying language.
The authority of the Special Counsel, however, was unaffected because
no similar limitations were imposed. Nevertheless, the President insists
that the Special Counsel faces the same evidentiary burdens as the pri-
vate litigant. If the President's position is correct, Congress accom-
plished nothing by limiting the private right of action. The coterminous
relationship that existed prior to the Conference continued unchanged,
only the nature of an actionable offense is new.
If the objective of the Conference was to narrow the private right of
action to less than that enjoyed by the Special Counsel, then, according
to the President, it failed. Instead, the President believes that the Con-
ference Committee altered the entire scheme of the antidiscrimination
provision-something the House conferees promised not to do. 197 Mili-
tating against the President's conclusion is the lack of debate that sec-
tion 274B engendered when it was introduced. 198 Had the 1984
Conference Committee substantially altered the substance of the an-
tidiscrimination provision, considerable debate would have ensued from
those conferees who supported the provision in its original form.
Finally, if Congress intended to modify the Special Counsel's au-
thority, it should have done so expressly.199 The President's argument,
by reference to the private right of action, will not withstand scrutiny.
A fundamental maxim of statutory construction is that the "plain
meaning" of words must be given their full effect and neither trans-
posed nor interpreted so as to create ambiguity when none previously
existed.2 00 At best, the President's reading of the Special Counsel's au-
thority is ambiguous. Giving import to its plain language, the statute
restricts the private litigant, not the Special Counsel.
197. See supra note 193.
198. The debate on the IRCA's antidiscrimination provision takes up less than six pages in
the Congressional Record and concerns an amendment offered by Representative Dan Lungran to
strike in its entirety § 274B. 132 CONG. REc. H9767-72 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986). The amendment
was defeated handily, id. at H9772, and the discussion essentially revolved around the same issue
that the House had considered in the previous Congress. There was no discussion concerning the
power of the Special Counsel, nor, for that matter, was there any discussion of the private right of
action.
199. See United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 310-11 (1960) (stating that inaction by Con-
gress affords the most dubious foundation for drawing inferences concerning the interpretation of
statute).
200. See United States v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 315 (1953); see also B. DicKER-
SON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATuTEs 229-37 (1975).
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B. Title VII Disparate Treatment Doctrine Remains in Effect
Section 274B is intended to prohibit discrimination against non-
citizens in all its manifestations. The structure of the statute creates
alternative causes of action. On the one hand, the private litigant is
limited to claims alleging intentional discriminatory activity. On the
other hand, the Special Counsel is unencumbered by restrictive statu-
tory language. The issue becomes which theory of liability and corre-
sponding standard of proof the Special Counsel is required to satisfy in
order to show a violation of section 274B.
If the IRCA is intended to reach facially neutral employment prac-
tices that have a discriminatory effect, then the theory of liability will
be disparate impact, and the standard unintentional discrimination.
Conversely, if the law targets only intentional acts of discrimination
then the theory will be disparate treatment, and the standard inten-
tional discrimination. There are no talismanic devices to discern the
meaning of congressional intent. With section 274B, however, one is
guided by Title VII.
The antidiscrimination provision of the IRCA is modeled on Title
VII,20 and extends Title VII's protection against national origin dis-
crimination to employees not covered already.2 " As Representative
Frank noted, the Act is intended to add to, not replace, existing Title
VII remedies. 03 Similarly, the Conference Report on the Act specifi-
cally indicated that Title VII protections were to be broadened under
the new law.20 4 Thus, it is clear that Congress intended to maintain Ti-
tle VII when it enacted the IRCA.
It is axiomatic in Title VII litigation that a claim may proceed
under either disparate impact or disparate treatment standards of
proof. 05 Restricting a claimant to one or the other standard sets a dan-
gerous precedent for civil rights law because it, in effect, would state
that normal civil rights protections against job discrimination do not
apply.20
When Congress enacted the IRCA it was fearful that employer
sanctions would have a discriminatory effect on those who "looked or
201. H.R CoNP. REP. No. 1000, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 [hereinafter H.R. CONe. REP. No.
1000], reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE, supra note 46, at 5840, 5842 (stating that "[t]he [antidis-
crimination provision] broadens the Title VII protections against national origin discrimination,
while not broadening the other Title VII protections").
202. See supra note 99 for statutory limitations on Title VII.
203. H.R. 1510, supra note 186, at H5641 (commenting on House Bill 1510).
204. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1000, supra note 201, at 87, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE, supra
note 46, at 5842.
205. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 334 n.15 (1977).
206. N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1986, at 1, col. 1 (city ed.) (quoting Arnold Leibowitz, former
Senate Counsel on Immigration).
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sounded" foreign. 0 7 In response, Congress included section 274B in the
IRCA. This provision bans employment discrimination on the basis of
an individual's citizenship status or national origin, whether such dis-
crimination is intentional or unintentional. In order to effectuate sec-
tion 274B, Congress vested in the Special Counsel a broad right of
action, similar to the rights granted to the EEOC under Title VII.
While Congress did limit the private right of action to claims alleging
intentional discrimination, it imposed no similar restriction on the Spe-
cial Counsel. The President argues that, however, by implication de-
rived from the private right of action, Congress also restrained the
Special Counsel.
When Congress adopted the IRCA, it ratified existing antidis-
crimination provisions in Title VII. In doing so, Congress intended to
allow the Special Counsel to prosecute discrimination resulting from
facially neutral employment practices. The President's contention that
Congress impliedly repealed Title VII disparate impact jurisprudence is
misguided.
It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that "repeals by
implication are not favored."20 8 Congress is presumed to know the effect
of its legislative action and to speak clearly when it intends to modify a
previously enacted statute."9 The Act's legislative history expressly
confirms, rather than implicitly repeals, Title VII's protections. The
House Education and Labor Committee Report on the IRCA directly
addressed the Title VII issue, stating that no provision of the Act is
intended to limit the power of the EEOC. To do otherwise would be
counterproductive of the Committee's intent. 10
Section 274B complements Title VII by extending its protection to
persons otherwise not covered. Part of the protection extended is the
right to base a cause of action on either disparate treatment or dispa-
rate impact. Although Congress has precluded the private litigant from
relying on disparate impact, it has manifested no similar intention to-
ward the Special Counsel. The President's insistence that the IRCA re-
quires the Special Counsel to establish discriminatory intent in all
allegations of unfair labor practices is inconsistent with traditional Title
VII case law. President Reagan's position assumes that individuals cov-
ered under section 274B are not entitled to the same protection that
207. See Joint Hearing, supra note 48, at 123-28 (statement of Rep. Garcia acknowledging
that persons of "foreign" appearance or accent are most likely to feel the full brunt of discrimina-
tion resulting from employer sanctions).
208. United States v. United Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 168 (1976).
209. Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976).




Title VII affords other minority groups. This assumption is unwar-
ranted by the Act's legislative history. At the very least, such an inter-
pretation leaves uncovered many evils that Congress intended to
prohibit.
For example, a facially neutral policy that requires the automatic
termination of employees who falsify employment applications with in-
valid social security numbers would fall disproportionally on previously
undocumented aliens.211 The Act stipulates that undocumented aliens
who apply for amnesty and eventual citizenship must reveal their sta-
tus. Thus, an employer who had a policy of automatic termination
could identify immediately those workers who had falsified their appli-
cation. Congress did not intend to force qualified aliens to make the
choice between employment and citizenship. It is this choice, however,
that aliens will face if the Special Counsel is not allowed to pursue
facially neutral employment practices that have a disproportionate
impact.
VIII. THE FUTURE OF LITIGATION UNDER SECTION 274B
Regardless of the theory of liability ultimately adopted by courts,
the IRCA's future as a font for employment litigation is uncertain.
There are a number of disincentives that are likely to prevent section
274B from becoming a mainstay of civil rights litigation. First, there is
a slim chance of being awarded attorney's fees. Although the Act stipu-
lates that attorney's fees are awardable if the losing party's case is with-
out merit,212 in essence this standard requires that the losing suit be
frivolous. The difficulty of establishing legal frivolity combined with the
IRCA's absence of a punitive damages provision will inhibit litigation.
A second disincentive is the limited coverage that section 274B
provides. The antidiscrimination provision is restricted to claims of un-
fair immigration-related employment practices resulting from the hir-
ing, recruitment, referral for a fee, or discharge2"3 of an individual based
on citizenship status or national origin. Compared with Title VII and
section 1981, the statutory breadth of the IRCA is considerably smaller.
Finally, the statute protects only citizens or intending citizens. 21"4
The latter category, from which most of the complainants will come, is
211. See generally League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Pasadena Indep. School
Dist., 662 F. Supp. 443 (S.D. Tex. 1987) (from which the foregoing example is drawn). This is the
first court to consider § 274B in terms of the requisite standard of proof required to show a viola-
tion. The court concluded that § 274B does not require evidence of intentional discrimination. The
LULAC court specifically recognized that Title VII provides the foundation for § 274B.
212. IRCA, supra note 1, § 274B(h), at 3378.
213. Id. § 274B(a)(1), at 3374.
214. Id. § 274B(a)(3)(A), (B), at 3374-75.
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narrowly defined.215 Thus, the number of potential litigants will be
limited.
IX. CONCLUSION
In 1986 the confluence of politics and legislative momentum re-
sulted in the enactment of the IRCA. The primary purpose of the Act
was to impose sanctions against employers who hired undocumented
aliens. Many in Congress feared that employers seeking to avoid the
possibility of severe penalties would discriminate against anyone who
appeared foreign, whether by name or by appearance. In response to
this concern, Congress enacted the antidiscrimination provision of the
IRCA. This provision, known as section 274B, prohibits discrimination
on the basis of citizenship status or national origin. In order to enforce
section 274B, Congress created the Office of the Special Counsel.
Congress vested in the Office the authority to investigate and pros-
ecute claims of unfair immigration-related employment practices. The
legislative history of section 274B clearly indicates that Congress did
not limit the Special Counsel's right of action to claims alleging only
intentional acts of discrimination. Practices neutral on their face but
discriminatory in their impact also are prohibited.
Carlos A. Gonzdlez*
215. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
* My thanks go to Robert Belton, Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law, who
first introduced me to the topic of this Note and then guided me through its more difficult parts. I
also want to recognize the assistance of my wife, Marilyn, without whom this project would never
have reached fruition.
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